In this paper we give a résumé of the correlation concept that underlies the models for credit risk measurement, for the rating of structured products, for the pricing of (tranches of) structured products, and for the Basel II capital charges. We discuss how securitization has changed the risk characteristics of the credit portfolios and enter into the requirement of transparent and liquid credit indices for the credit portfolio management and for the further development of the securitization market. To capture the the evolution in the financial and economic environment (for instance, reflected in the changing risk characteristics) we formulate the basis concepts of a dynamic credit portfolio management framework, that would build further on the common static Ratings Based risk methods.
Introduction
At the heart of the crisis that started mid 2007 are the loan securitization markets 1 . During the last five years the loan securitization markets have known an impressive development, characterized by strong financial engineering. In broad, the securitization of loan assets has become a key part in the business model of many large financial institutions. It led to an interplay between the financial institutions that, on the one hand, shed loans via securitization and, on the other hand, took securitization products on their books.
However, the risk characteristics of these products are relatively different from, for instance, single name loans or bonds. By pooling the credit assets, investments in the securitization products (specifically high-grade CDO tranches) represent relatively strong exposures to systematic risk. The dependencies (correlations) between the collateral, the negative convexity (for instance introduced by tranching) and the often huge leverage within these products or investment strategies reinforces the strength of the exposure to the systematic risk. Additionally, within a portfolio context the dependencies between the securitizaton notes are, overall, relatively stronger than in between single name bonds and loans (due to this relatively stronger exposure to systematic risks). Hence, these risk characteristics thus imply a relatively stronger exposure of the credit portfolio to the systematic events. This is illustrated well in the crisis by the speed and the extent that an initial systematic event (the falling US mortgage prices and subsequent increase in expected delinquencies) translates in write-offs and losses throughout the entire financial system (although, of course, this is only one of the features at play in the crisis).
In the paper, we discuss (in section 2 and section 3) how under the regulatory Basel II IRB framework and the general portfolio credit risk models the systematic risk factor is introduced. In other words, we thus focus on how dependencies are entered in these models.
In section 4 we enter on the securitization framework and particularly focus on how correlations between the collateral was taken into account. We also show how the framework was built on the implicit assumption of liquid loan securitization markets. In section 5 we describe the process and standard methods underlying the pricing of CDOs. We specifically show the importance of the standardized CDS indices, for the pricing and trading of CDOs.
Section 6 brings the different elements of previous sections together, as we discuss the (shortterm) credit portfolio management (or credit ALM). Again we show that liquid standardized credit indices are necessary for the (short-term) hedging of the (mark-to-market value) of the credit portfolio. Additionally we discuss that in general transparent and liquid standardized credit indices for the loan securitization markets (in contrast to the corporate bond securitization markets) are absent. We see this absence as an important feature contributing to the dislocations in the loan securitization market. Moreover, we see increased transparency and liquidity of standardized credit indices as essential for the loan securitization market to grow and develop further.
The stronger market dependence of financial institutions their business model, the strongly evolving financial and economic conditions and the changing risk characteristics of investment products (due to financial innovation and development) plead for dynamic risk management frameworks. Two crucial aspects of a dynamic risk management framework are: portfolio dependency and a frequent updating of the assumptions underlying the models. Therefore, building on the commonly applied static Ratings Based Approach, we describe in section 7 the main concepts of a dynamic credit management framework. Central to the framework are the concepts of economic capital, stress tests and scenario analysis.
Regulatory Capital and Basel Formulas
The increased use of sophisticated models by large financial institutions to manage their credit portfolios and the acknowledgment by the supervisory community of the failures (see e.g. [Jon98] ) of the regulatory rules established by the 1988 Basel Accord (commonly known as Basel I), led to the development of the BIS document International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (hereafter, the Basel II framework) and its current implementation in the different jurisdictions. Though, after its assessment of the financial institution's internal models, the Basel Committee concluded that these models were -due to the insufficient degree of comparability across models and the calibration restrictions stemming from data scarcity -not ready to be used for regulatory purposes. Particularly, the modeling and measurement of default dependencies between obligors showed and still shows (as is discussed in this paper) to be precarious.
Therefore, Basel II employs the so called Ratings Based Approach (RBA). Under this approach, the credits of the bank's portfolio are grouped in homogeneous pools or "buckets" of credits with the same characteristics. For the Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) approach these characteristics are: the borrower's rating, the loan type (sovereign, corporate, project financing, ABS), the seniority (e.g. senior secured or subordinate) and the maturity. Each unit exposure in a common bucket receives a predetermined fixed capital charge. Hence, this approach makes that the capital charges are portfolio-invariant, i.e. the capital charge only depends on the characteristics of the exposure and not on the characteristics of the portfolio, of which it is part. Gordy (2003) [Gor03] shows that the portfolio-invariance condition holds for risk-factor models, if, the portfolio is asymptotically fine-grained (first assumption) and, there is only one single systematic risk factor (second assumption). The Asymptotic Single Risk Factor (ASRF) model underlying the IRB formulas is based on the Merton model (see section A.1 above) and the work of Vasicek (2002) [Vas02] . Thereby, the probability of loss of an exposure conditional on a single systematic risk factor (X) is given by:
(1)
Where the single systematic factor (X) and the idiosyncratic factor (ξ A ) have standard normal distributions and are uncorrelated with each other. This gives the probability of loss of an exposure A, conditional on a single systematic risk factor:
Thereby, PD is the one-year probability of default. ρ introduces the dependence of the asset value of a borrower on the systematic risk factor (X); the general state of the economy. Or the correlation between the two variables (returns) y A and y B which drive the borrower default for exposures A and B equals ρ 2 . These asset correlations importantly determine the shape of the IRB risk weight formulas. The correlations vary between the different asset classes, since these different sorts of borrowers significantly differ in their dependence on the general economy.
For instance, large corporates show to depend more on the general economic state and thus to have a higher correlation than the retail portfolio, of which the borrowers are thus only weakly interlinked. The correlations for the different asset classes are predetermined via asset correlation functions 2 in the IRB formulas (see BIS [oBSB05] ). As the dependencies between the obligors are fixed in the IRB approach, the focus of the market participants is put on the PD variable and additionally the loss given default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD) variables for the advanced IRB.
From the two assumptions (asymptotically fine-grained portfolio and one single systematic risk factor) the additivity condition is derived, meaning that the risk assessments can be conducted at the individual exposure level and that the results can be added up to give the risk assessment of the portfolio. However, if the two assumptions do not hold then the bottom-up approach is likely to give an inaccurate assessment of the credit portfolio risk. Though, for the reasons of its relative simplicity, the inadequate stage of development of the credit portfolio models for regulatory purposes at the time, and the fact that the validation of the inputs is more convenient and easier than the validation of the entire models, the bottom-up approach was opted as basis for the first pillar IRB capital charges [oBSB06] .
In the real world credit portfolios are not asymptotically fine-grained, they are finite and credit defaults and their dependencies do depend on more than one single risk factor (such as the global business cycle). Hence, the marginal contribution of a single exposure to the total risk of the portfolio depends on the composition of the portfolio toward single names or other 'local' risk factors. Therefore, the sum of the IRB capital charges might under-state the risk of the portfolio depending on its composition, relative to the well-diversified basis portfolio used for the calibration of the IRB formulas.
The implications, in terms of incorrect assessments of the risks, from the violation of the first assumption are relatively well-understood and methods to capture the single-name concentration are quite far developed (see e.g. Gordy et al [GL07] , Heitfield et al [EH05] ). From the second assumption it thus follows that the ASRF model does not capture the sector concentration risk, as it does not allow for the rich dependency structure between the credit defaults of obligors. Since the sector concentration risk concerns dependencies the issue is not straightforward measurable and remains technically challenging (as will be discussed in the following sections). Both issues of single name concentration risk and sector concentration risk are addressed in the second pillar of the Basel II framework.
Portfolio Credit Risk and Economic Capital
The Economic Capital (ECAP) is the amount of capital to be set aside by a financial institution in order to prevent its net asset value to fall below the level that could affect its business or would hinder the pursuit of its strategic objectives. While Regulatory Capital (RC) (explained in section 2) is the capital required by the regulators, the ECAP is a firm's internal estimate 3 .
For the determination of the ECAP and its allocation the tail of the loss distribution is crucial. A key parameter that affects this tail is the correlation. This section will be divided in two subsections. The first is dedicated to the computation of economic capital and its allocation. While the other gives a brief discussion of the methodologies employed to introduce the correlation parameter into the credit risk systems. With as main objective to show that there is no standard practice on the correlation assumptions entering the ECAP calculations.
Economic Capital and its Allocation
The joint loss distribution of the credit portfolios thus has to be generated to estimate its economic capital. The factor approach (as described in section A.3) is a basis for this and assumes that the return of each asset i in the portfolio is given by:
where ξ i is the idiosyncratic factor (supposed to be N (0, 1)) and X m is the market factor often represented by an industrial and a country factor and given by:
where ω ind and ω country are the industry and country weights. To introduce the dependencies one uses the gaussian copula approach as described in section A.2 (for more detail we refer to Gupta et al [GFB97] ). For historical reasons VaR has been taken as the standard market measure for ECAP calculation. Using the VaR concept the ECAP of a bank is defined as (see fig.1 ):
that is ECAP is defined as the amount of capital the bank is supposed to set aside to serve as a buffer for any unexpected loss defined as an event of probability 4 (1 − q). Once the loss distribution has been calculated one needs certain risk measures to determine and allocate the ECAP among the business lines. The recent enormous increase in competition and its pressure on business margins has strengthened the need for the efficient use of ECAP and its allocation among the different entities and business lines of a financial conglomerate. Although VaR is widely used in the evaluation of the total ECAP, it is well known that VaR is not a subadditive risk measure (that is the addition of the VaR of two subportfolios may be larger than the portfolio VaR). We refer to Artzner et al. [ADEH99] and Tasche [Tas04] for the issues of coherent risk measures and the allocation of economic capital. One of difficulties of using the so called VaR(/Covar) approach for allocating capital is that a certain subportfolio may be obliged to allocate more capital than the size of the subportfolio itself. A solution is then to allocate ECAP using an alternative risk measure that avoids this issue. This has been addressed by Garcia et al. [GAL06] where they compare different allocation methodologies currently being used in the market. 
Different Correlation Assumptions
As previously mentioned for the risk management the tail of the loss distribution is crucial. Dependencies between the credit defaults strongly determine the tail. Hence, the modeling assumptions made to capture these dependencies significantly determine the accurateness of the risk estimates (see Fig 2) .
In general, the risk models (as described in the appendix) make use of (linear) correlations to introduce these dependencies. We refer to Embrechts et all [EMS99] for a reference addressing the common pitfalls related to the correlation concept as a measure of dependency. In this section we briefly discuss the different challenges encountered to derive the default correlation parameter and the lack of consensus among market practitioners on the methodologies to incorporate the default correlations estimates in the risk models.
A correlation is of second order and is thus not directly observable or measurable. The number of defaults (of obligors) however is relatively limited, and it generally yields insufficient observations to adequately deduce the default correlations from the actual defaults. As an alternative to the scarcity of default data, market participants established different techniques. A first general technique is to derive the default correlation from the asset correlations, calculated from the asset data (e.g. equity returns and credit spreads). The technique permits one to go from asset correlation to default correlation and vice versa, permitting one to compare the asset correlation implied from the limited default data. Fig. 3 and fig. 4 shows the results of different studies that derive asset correlations from default and asset values respectively. It is clear that both the range of correlation estimates of the individual studies is quite large and the estimates differ importantly between the studies. We refer to Chernih [CVH06] for a more detailed discussion on the different studies.
Several of these studies thus derive the default correlation from the correlation between the equity returns. Note, though, that de Servigny and Renault [dSR03] show that the link between the two is quite poor. As an example of the careful interpretation that the derived correlation estimates require, table 1 depicts the default correlation between Belgium, France, Germany and Greece calculated using equity index returns. Generally, one would expect that the correlations between Belgium, France, Germany would be higher than the correlation between France, Germany and Greece. As we see in the table that is not the case. An explanation for these counterintuitive results is that the Belgian equity index (BEL 20) has a relatively high weight of financials, which is not the case for Germany and France.
An alternative methodology employed by market participants is to infer default correlations from rating migrations. This methodology is, for instance, used by Cassart et al. [CCLA07] who additionally estimates confidence sets for their derived default correlations and by Moody's for their corporate CDO tool.
In the next section we discuss more in detail the methodologies employed by the rating agen- cies to evaluate the correlation parameters for the structured products. However, except for these rating agency analysis, studies that specifically tackle the correlation issues for structured products are strongly limited. Showing that this issue did not receive a lot of coverage by the market participants.
As it can be seen in Chernih et al [CVH06] with few exceptions most of the studies mentioned do not address the issue of time horizon. Using 10 to 20 year data to calculate correlations would give a more robust estimate than if one would use 3 to 5 year data. Using long dated datasets however has the potential to include correlation patterns that have changed in most recent years. For instance, the recent enormous development in the information technology may have changed the nature of the markets making past data less relevant.
Securitization and CDO Models
The enormous growth of the CDO market is depicted in fig. 5 . Several reasons have driven this growth, for instance, the optimization of RC and ECAP use, specific investment opportunities and attracting new funding sources. By using securitization a financial institution transfers loans to the market that otherwise would have stayed until maturity on its books. In principle one may securitize any source of cash flow: residential and commercial mortgages, leases (e.g. auto and aircraft), credit card loans, student loans. The main purpose of this section is to discuss the importance of the correlation and the liquidity assumptions underlying the securitization process. of a certain rating is, ceteris paribus, higher or equal than the cost of capital of a securitization note of the same rating (systematic risk). More specifically, when investing in a single name bond of a certain rating and maturity one is still exposed to idiosyncratic risk, while investing in a (high grade) CDO note of the same rating and maturity one is relatively more exposed to systematic risk. In fig.7 we show the cost of capital for a bond and for CDO's 5 . A leverage SS is a leverage position in a super senior note. As an example an investment of 10 mio would have a return of 5 to 10 times its invested capital. Comparing an investment on a well rated (say AA or AAA) corporate bond with an investment on a same rated CDO note, the second gives a higher spread while having the same regulatory capital cost of the first 6 . Though, as we have seen recently underlying the securitization activity was an implicit assumption of liquidity that the market was not aware of.
Similarly, as with the credit portfolio risk assessment discussed in section 3, to rate a structured note one needs to generate the loss distribution of the underlying portfolio. The rating agencies use an algorithm whose set-up is very similar with the one expressed in eq. 4 and eq. 5.
Once the loss distribution has been generated the rating of the tranche will depend on the level of subordination under it (that is how much losses may happen before the tranche begins to be affected). To determine the rating Moody's takes into account the expected loss (EL) of the tranche, thereby employing a mapping between EL of a tranche and the rating attributed to it. S&P and Fitch on the other hand base their approach on the so called first dollar of loss methodology (supposed to be more in line with a VaR methodology (see e.g.Neu2004 [Neu04] for more details)).
The correlation matrix used in the generation of the loss distribution depends on the type of the asset class of the collateral of the securitization note. There are differences in the correlation matrices used by each agency. The differences in the correlation matrices employed by the agencies become particularly striking when the collateral are ABS notes (or for so called ABS CDOs). We refer to Gill et all [YFO04] and Toutain et all [OTY05] for a description of Moody's correlation methodologies for both corporates and structured finance CDOs, respectively. Observe that the studies underline the issue of scarce data and the difficulty to derive an adequate methodology to cope with it for both asset classes. For the corporate asset class, for example, Moody's shows the results of two methodologies (see fig. 9 ). One approach called G-Corr (to mean Global Correlation) is intuitively similar to the idea of asset correlation although it uses a regression model among the factors (industries and countries). The second approach (called Directional Rating Transition Matrix (DRTM)) evaluates default correlation from rating transitions.
When the collateral is structured product (as in a CDO of ABS's) the difference in methodologies and on correlation matrices among the agencies are relatively more significant. Moody's for example uses an add-on approach that depends on the structured finance sector (subdivided in global, meta, broad and narrow), regional, or vintage. Fitch and S&P on the other hand use the so called drill down approach. The idea behind the approach is to take directly the underlying names within the ABS CDO transaction into account (see fig. 33 ), and in such a way, better capture the level of correlation among the ABS's in the collateral portfolio. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that (as reported e.g. by Fitch [Neu04] and S&P [KG03] ) the correlation among ABS collateral in a CDO of ABS transaction is much higher than the correlation among simple bonds.
For determining the loss distribution of the securitization, default probabilities and correlations are employed which are derived from studies on past data (historic view). Hence, the implicit assumption to determine the rating of the tranche represents a long term buy and hold strategy. Once the loss distribution and the rating of a tranche have been determined, the spread of the tranche is derived by comparing the structure with a similar deal in the market. Therefore, inherent to this approach is the implicit assumption of market liquidity. 
The Pricing of CDOs
Standardized synthetic CDO indices are for credit markets analogous to what equity indices are for the equity market. They bring liquidity to the credit market as they facilitate direct investments to a standardized credit portfolio, taking short positions and offer a key tool for the pricing discovery. An indication of their importance is reflected in their relative strong growth (see fig. 10 ). Besides the relatively well established corporate indexes (iTraxx and CDX) recently quite some new indices and tranches were launched, such as for subprime home equity MBS (ABX.HE and TABX.HE, see MarkIt The pricing, though, of standardised credit indices (and their tranches) is much more complex compared to equity indices. In this section we treat the pricing methodology for the well established corporate indices and their tranches 7 . We will postpone the pricing issues related to the recently created ABX.HE and TABX.HE to section 6.
Similarly to credit portfolio risk methods (see section 3) and the securitization methods (see section 4), the pricing of a standardized CDO tranche also requires the generation of the loss distribution of the underlying portfolio. For the pricing of the standardized indexes the collateral is assumed to depend on an idiosyncratic risk factor and one systematic risk factor, as in eq. 2 and, therefore, thus differs from the multi-factor setup of the credit risk and securitization methods. The main reason for this approach is simplicity: a 1-factor model needs much less computing time for pricing, calibration and generation of hedge/risk parameters. In annex B we give a brief description of the standardized market algorithm for generating the loss distribution for pricing purposes (called the recursive approach) first proposed by Andersen et al. [ASB03] .
For the pricing of CDOs the input parameters differ importantly compared to the models described in the previous sections. The required parameters are: recovery rates, risk neutral probabilities of default and correlation. Currently the recovery rate is, for instance, set at 40% for the iTraxx and CDX. The probabilities of default are the ones that match observed CDS market quotes (for this reason named risk neutral). The correlation parameter is the one that matches the observed tranche quotes and due to its importance for the pricing is treated in more detail in the next subsection.
Implied versus Base Correlation
In this section we show that the pricing of bespoke CDOs depends on the correlations implied by the spreads of the liquid standardized CDS indices. In other words, one uses the concept of risk neutral pricing for correlations, in the same way that volatility of equity is derived from traded options. The first methodology that market participants employed was the concept of implied or compound correlation defined as the correlation that is derived from eq. 2 and matches the value of the tranche to the observed market spread. Hence, given the implied correlation parameter one can directly assess the tranche spread and vice versa. We show in fig.30 a typical example of a compound correlation curve.
The main difficulty with the implied correlation methodology is that the correlation curve does not permit an easy use for hedging or structuring purposes. For instance, for the iTraxx
Assume that the implied (or compound) correlation curve of the iTraxx index is given in fig. 30 . Then consider the pricing of a non-standard (bespoke) CDO tranche with respectively 4% and 10% as attachment and detachment points. The question that arises is which compound correlation to use for the [4%-10%] tranche? More specifically, is it possible to adapt the compound correlation curve to price non-standard tranches of iTraxx? Fig. 32 illustrates this question.
To solve this a standard market practice is to use the concept of Base (or Equity) Correlation. In the base correlation framework, the expected loss on a tranche is computed as the difference of the expected loss of two equity tranches:
where ρ D and ρ A are the (base or equity) correlations to price the equity tranches [0%-D%] and [0%-A%] respectively. An example of a base correlation curve is depicted in fig. 11 . As a result of eq. 7 the price of any tranche is given by the difference in prices of two equity tranches. The approach is better illustrated in fig. 12 where the [3%-6%] tranche is a function of [0%-3%] and [0%-6%] equity tranches. The advantage of the base correlation approach is that it gives a relatively simple solution when one needs to price tranches with non-standard attachment or detachment points. As observed in fig. 12 , however, the base correlation concept has a fundamental inconsistency. When pricing the [A%-D%] tranche one uses two different correlation assumptions for the same [0%-A%] piece: one correlation (ρ 1 ) when pricing the [0%-A%] and another correlation (ρ 2 ) when pricing that portion inside of the [0%-D%] equity tranche. A second and more practical issue relates to the reliance on interpolation methodologies: the price of a bespoke tranche may vary significantly depending on the interpolation methodology used. We refer to McGinty et al. [LMM04] and O'Kane and Livasey [OM04] for more details on the concept of base correlation. We recall that the standard market model uses the gaussian copula and its choice has been based on two reasons: one is simplicity and the other is the theoretical background provided by the Merton / Black Scholes framework (as mentioned in section A.1). As the copula is not unique practitioners have tested different distributions and we refer to Andersen and Sidenius [AS05] for a survey on the different copulas. It is worth mentioning that the assumption of continuity implicit in the gaussian copula has an impact on the hedge parameters. Recently there has been proposals to use jump processes for CDO pricing and we refer Baxter et al [Bax06] , Albrecher et al [ALS06] and Garcia, Goossens and Schoutens [GGS07] for pricing the indices using different Lévy processes.
Although the base correlation approach may have given a solution for the pricing of nonstandard tranches it introduced additional challenges. As an example we mention the extrapolation of the base correlation curve: that is what would the base correlation be for points outside the quoted attachments and detachment intervals (e.g. the [0%-2%] or [35%-100%] tranches)? Additionally, assume the base correlation has moved from one day to the other. By only looking to the changes in the base correlation, what can be said about the relative prices between the tranches? The difficulty with base correlation is that the concept is not very intuitive; by only observing the moves of the base correlation one cannot derive immediate arbitrage opportunities. Moreover note that above methodologies are not necessarily arbitrage free.
Recently, studies have come up with approaches to address these particular issues and have as basic proposition to move from the base correlation concept to the much more intuitive approach of base expected loss or implied tranche losses (we refer to Parcel and Wood [PW07] and to Torresetti et al. [TBP07] ). We also refer to Garcia and Goossens [GS07] for the use of base expected loss to find attachment and detachment points that are arbitrage free both for the gaussian and the Lévy models.
Currently we have focused on the pricing approach for the standardized and bespoke CDOs, in the next sections we discuss the use of the indices for portfolio management purposes and show the importance of the standardized CDO indices for the pricing discovery.
Correlation Mapping and Credit Portfolio Management
In this section we discuss the standardized synthetic credit derivative indices as the appropriate market instruments to manage the systematic risk of the credit portfolio (which explains their emergence and strong growth). Additionally we focus on the relation between the credit turmoil that started in the summer of 2007, and the need for enhanced transparency in the loan securitization market and the standardized indices, for the securitization model to remain and to develop further. Fig. 13 shows the size of the US bond market and the relative importance of the different asset classes. Evidence of the strong securitization growth is depicted in the fig. 14 and fig. 15 . They show the number of new issues at each year and the total number of outstanding securi- The securitization activity over the recent years has become strategic for the financial institutions as it permits the efficient use of regulatory and economic capital. Transferring assets through securitization frees a firms capital, that otherwise would have been trapped to the debt held in the bank's books (thereby providing a fee income). Moreover, it provides a tool to shed concentrated exposures.
Recall that for the investor, the securitization note requires a cost of capital that is lower or equal than the one of a single name bond or loan with the same rating and maturity (see section 4). Moreover, it is well known that for the same rating and maturity the securitization note has given a higher spread than the individual bond or loan. Two common arguments were traditionally provided by market practitioners for this higher spread. First, the complexity of the securitization deals implies higher processing costs both in terms of systems and in human capital. The second reason is the so called rating change momentum (see e.g. Batchvarov [BCD03] ): although ratings of securitization notes are reported to be more stable, when conditioning on rating changes the variations in ratings are much faster than the variations for single name instruments. This has been observed during the CDO debacle of 2002 and during the more recent credit crisis when high grade tranches have been downgraded very fast from investment grade to junk and even default.
Securitization transforms the risk characteristics of the financial institutions' credit portfolio. Overall, by pooling the collateral, the securitization mechanism reduces the exposure to idiosyncratic risk and increases the exposure to systematic risk 9 . Via the tranching technique, securitization offers investors exposures to different portions of the capital structure 10 . This implies that the higher one invests in the capital structure the lower 9 An example to illustrate the interplay between correlation and systematic risk that characterizes securitization, is the following (see fig. 16 ). Consider two alternative investment strategies involving the same amount (say 1 bi USD) equally divided in two possible sectors: financials and semiconductors. In Portfolio A, one has an exposure to 2 companies each belonging to one sector, and each company receiving half of the total investment. In Portfolio B, one has an exposure to 20 companies, 10 belonging to each sector, and each company receiving an investment of 1/20 of the total invested. Observe that although Portfolio A is more exposed to idiosyncratic risk, Portfolio B is certainly more exposed to systematic risk, as the level of exposure to the market as a whole increased.
10 Moreover, introducing credit enhancement techniques makes the structures even more appealing to a broader pool of investors (which are attracted by the risk/return trade-off), thereby potentially decreasing the costs of funding of the financial institution. For example think of an insurance company that gets access to an emerging market debt instrument by investing on a AAA tranche of an emerging market CDO. the exposure to the idiosyncratic risk and the higher the exposure to systematic risk. Hence, in a systematic credit event (where credit defaults become more correlated), the probability that losses will affect the higher-rated tranches increases (higher-rated tranches are short correlation). Tranching also introduces the effect that a widening of credit spreads has a stronger impact on prices than a narrowing and that prices decline at an increasing rate the more the spreads widen (often referred to as negative convexity).
Moreover, securitization products and investment strategies incorporate additional leverage 11 . In general, these features increase the extent and speed of a systematic event materialising in price declines and losses for these securitization notes. In addition, in a portfolio context, the dependencies between the securitization notes, compared to dependencies between single name bonds or loans, are in general relatively stronger 12 . Hence, these risk features strongly influence the risk characteristics of a credit portfolio, thereby, leading to relatively significant exposures (or high sensitivity) to systematic events.
We see the combination of inadequately recognizing the changes in risk characteristics with the illiquidity and absence of appropriate standardized indices as two important elements leading 11 One example of a structured product, incorporating additional leverage is the LSS (leveraged super senior). Under the strategy a certain amount (say 1 bi) is invested on very upper levels of the capital structure (say above 20% attachment point) with a leverage factor that can vary from 2 to 10. The strategy is typically rated AAA and offers a significantly higher return (depending on the leverage factor) in comparison with single name exposures of the same rating.
12 Observe that notes of single name CDOs when inserted in a portfolio is closely related to the portfolio of a CDO of ABS.
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Standardized Credit Indices for Credit Portfolio Management
Given a general trend toward more fair value accounting; a growing share of banks' credit assets is measured at fair-value for financial reporting purposes (trading, available-for-sale and fairvalue option assets) and are thus repriced on a regular basis. The trend reflects the (relative) greater liquidity and tradebility for an increasing number of credit products (and risk parameters) and offers the potential for a more active management of credit risk exposures. Though, despite the strong development of securitization (as shown above), (bespoke) securitization deals are still quite illiquid. For the (mark-to-market) management of its securitization transactions, the firm thus requires liquid credit (reference) instruments. Note that in this section we focus on the standardized indices for the management of portfolios composed of securitization notes, it should be clear that the same instruments also serve the management of the systematic risk of the credit portfolios or subportfolios of the financial institution. As an example we refer to Martin and Tasche [MT07] for a technique to evaluate the proportion of systematic risk (and as such hedgeable via an appropriate credit index) within a credit portfolio (we refer to section 7 for a more detailed discussion).
The recent creation of the standardized credit derivative indices represents a huge technological innovation for the credit portfolio management, their key purpose has been to solve (via standardization) the lacking liquidity in the (bespoke) credit securitizations. These instruments increase the liquidity in three ways. First, on a deal by deal basis, the standardized indices help in the so called price discovery process of the illiquid bespoke securitization deals. By price discovery we mean the process of increasing the amount of information available to market participants in order to deduce a price (that represents the equilibrium point between the supply and demand side) of the capital structure of a bespoke deal. Second, on a portfolio basis it helps to hedge a full portfolio of credits. Finally third, by referencing issuers, it may serve as a factor to increase the liquidity of otherwise very illiquid issuers.
As described in section 5 a key parameter for the pricing of the bespoke transactions, is the risk neutral base correlation. It is precisely for the deduction of this parameter that standardized and liquid credit indices are essential. Since, for the pricing of bespoke deals the base correlations for these tranches have to be derived from the base correlation curves of the standardized CDO indices, as the base correlation curves are generally only available for the standardized tranches of liquid credit indices. This is known among practitioners as correlation mapping and is solved by mapping the expected loss of the bespoke tranche onto the expected losses of tranches of the standardized index portfolio. For example assume one needs to determine the price of a tranche [A be − D be ] of a corporate bespoke CDO portfolio (for a certain maturity, say 5 year) composed of EU and US corporate names. To price it one needs to determine the base correlations ρ(A be ) and ρ(D be ) respectively for the attachment and detachment points of the tranche. The correlation mapping is intuitively shown in fig. 17 and it resumes to first mapping the bespoke tranche on the iTraxx (US corporate credit index), and on the CDX (EU corporate credit index). Once the base correlations (and consequent prices) of the bespoke portfolio are determined on both indices a weighted average of the prices is taken.
There are several techniques used in the market to interpolate the standardized base correlation curve and they may lead (on a deal by deal basis) to considerable price differences (we refer to appendix D for an example of a commonly employed mapping technique). For the purposes of this paper we highlight two points. First, the techniques currently available for the correlation mapping are more an art than a science. Second, although we have given an example of mapping the loss distribution of a tranche of a bespoke CDO, the mapping technique can be generalized to map different portions of the loss distribution of the financial institution's credit portfolio onto the loss distributions of appropriate standardized indices.
What we have so far discussed in this section is relatively well developed for securitization transactions and the credit indices referencing corporate bonds and corporate CDS's. For the corporate bonds there is thus a somewhat established market approach to price the bespoke CDO tranches. As briefly mentioned in section 5 in order to mimic the success of the corporate credit indices and bring liquidity to the (residential) mortgage credit market, the ABX.HE has been launched in 2006 and more recently the TABX.HE (the tranches of ABX.HE). Fig. 18 shows five ABX.HE indices based on the rating of the reference obligations (home equity subprime MBS's): AAA, AA, A, BBB and BBB-. The ABX.HE AAA, for instance, is composed of 20 AAA subprime ABS's. The TABX.HE (depicted in fig. 19 ) exists only for the BBB and BBB-ABS notes and is composed of two consecutive ABX.HE series, thereby, containing 40 ABS's BBB and BBB-for the TABX.BBB and TABX.BBB-respectively. 
Challenges for the credit portfolio management
Previously discussed fig. 13, fig. 14 and fig. 15 depict the size and the strong growth of the American residential MBS market. The ABX.HE / TABX.HE represent a great innovation to enhance the liquidity to the US mortgage market. However, differently from the corporate standardized indices, the collateral of the ABX.HE index and its TABX.HE tranches are CDS's of ABS's of subprime mortgage loans and, are, until this publication, quite illiquid. Two issues are driving this: first, there is no easily quote available for CDS's referencing (subprime) ABS's. Second, as the indices represent CDO of ABS's there is currently no standardized market approach to price these instruments. Given the size of the mortgage market and the credit crisis, in what follows we enter in more detail on the securitization, risk management and regulatory capital for securitization notes of MBS. Moreover, we show that the links among pricing transparency and credit portfolio management are key to the survival of the securitization framework for financial institutions.
We start with the rating agency 'rules' for the structured products of ABS. As described in section 4 the rating agencies use as input parameters in their models, historically estimated probabilities of default, recovery rates and correlations. Regarding the correlation parameter, the rating agencies' showed to differ strongly on the correlation estimates that have been introduced in their models. In section 5 we showed that Fitch uses far higher correlation estimates than Moody's (see Neugebauer [Neu04] and Toutain et al. [OTY05] ). Hence, it is doubtful that the Recall that Basel II capital charges have been constructed to have the properties of portfolioinvariance and additivity (see section 3). To obtain these conditions the assumptions of asymptotically fine-grained portfolio and one single systematic risk factor were made. As the correlation estimates are calculated on portfolios that did not include recently developed securitization products (such as ABS CDOs), we might derive that the systematic nature of these securitization instruments may have been underestimated.
In section 3 we mentioned that the credit portfolio risk methods of the financial institutions may have failed to take the correlation parameter of the securitization investments (or thus the systematic risk of the investments) sufficiently into account. The interplay of the financial institutions during the recent years led to freeing (idiosyncratic) exposures via securitization and investing in securitization products (shown in fig. 6 ) 13 . As the correlation parameter generally entered in the risk methods for the securitization investments was the same as the one for the single name bonds or loans, the necessary increase in the economic capital due to the higher real correlation from the stronger exposure to the systematic risk was not recognized. Hence, giving a false impression of increased diversification. In other words, in general, the risk methods of the financial institutions may have failed to adequately account for the risk dynamics of the securitization investments. A general remark that applies to the rating agency rules, to the credit portfolio risk methods and to the Basel II securitization framework is that data on ABS was absent when deriving the parameter estimates.
The difficulties underlying the pricing of the ABX.HE index and its tranches in terms of a generalized lack of standard practices strongly limits the transparency in this market. There are several issues behind it. First, the information available to market participants on the CDS of ABS quotes is severely limited. Hence, in contrast to the corporate sphere in which a view on risk neutral default probabilities is readily available from the CDS market, it is less straightforward for the ABS case.
Second, an important input parameter for the pricing of a CDS's on an ABS's is the prepayment assumption, that is, the amortization schedule on the notional of the ABS. The prepayment assumption can have a considerable impact on the implied default probabilities. In a recent study Garcia and Goossens [GG07] discuss that by using the prepayment assumptions given by the remittance reports of the underlying ABS instruments, which are quite similar to the ones reported by Moody's in fig. 20 , it is not possible to recover the observed market prices for the TABX.BBBtranches. Moreover, the market's view on prepayments (derived from the TABX.BBB-) is significantly lower than the ones contained in the remittance reports. A solution to this problem might be the adoption by market participants of a risk neutral CPR for index pricing purposes, just as has been done for the recovery rate. The importance for the market transparency is reflected n a recent report from UBS (see fig. 21 ). It shows the expectations for the prepayment of the better quality FNMA deals are significantly lower than the ones for subprime (as previously shown). Prepayments of the order given for FNMA, however, are closer to the ones necessary to recover the prices of the TABX tranches, showing that the actively traded indices are incorporating a level of information not available in remittances reports.
Third, we depict in fig. 22 the subordination levels and corresponding ratings on the capital structure as given by the rating agency models. Observe that with an underlying collateral mostly constituted of BBB and BBB-(although 5% to 10% of BB) the rating agency rules required a 20% support to get the AAA rating. However, in fig. 23 we show the time series of prices for the different tranches of the TABX index.
Observe that the TABX.HE BBB-for the tranche [40%-100%], already very close to its inception, had been trading at quotes below 10% upfront (already by Mar 2007). More recently that tranche (TABX.BBB-[40%-100%]) has been traded at around 80% upfront. The conclusion one can draw, is that there has been important information known certain ABS investors (reflected in the credit indices) that might not have been known or understood by market participants in general.
In the next section we propose a framework that integrates the credit ALM with the mid and long term credit portfolio management (taking into account the firm-wide strategic planning).
7 Strategic Management of the Credit ECAP: Stress Tests, Capital Planning and Credit ALM
The credit crisis shows that the securitization business model together with the recent general innovation in the credit space (e.g. the development of ABS CDO's) have important consequences for the management of the credit economic capital of a financial institution. Therefore, in this section we describe the main concepts a credit ECAP framework that builds further on the current static ratings based approach in order to enhance the flexibility of the framework. The proposed framework addresses, among others, the changing risk characteristics in the banking industry and incorporates a structure for the active management of the credit portfolio. In general the capital consumption, as determined in the risk systems of the firms and the Basel II framework, has been calibrated on certain portfolios in the past, and therefore, may not represent the current composition of an institutions portfolio 14 . The proposed framework is dynamic as it is based on two main aspects: portfolio dependency and time varying assumptions.
The objective of the firm is to optimize the risk-return trade-off, and thereby, preserve capital return ratios at pre-defined levels under different market conditions. In section 3, we determined the Economic Capital (ECAP) as the amount of capital to be set aside by a financial institution in order to prevent its net asset value to fall below the level that could impact its (short to mid term time-horizon) normal business activity or would hinder the pursuit of its strategic objectives (long term time-horizon). Hence, the framework to monitor the economic capital consumption should incorporate the evolution of capital on a mid term (as is currently mainstream one year) and on a multi-year horizon. The remaining discussion is separated into two parts, first, the framework for the dynamic credit ECAP calculations, and second, the active and ECAP management.
Dynamic credit Economic Capital Calculations
The proposed framework is designed to be much more dynamic than the static ratings based approach currently employed. This is attained by first, making credit risk (and the capital consumption) portfolio dependent; second, introducing time varying assumptions (by including the impact of scenarios analysis and stress tests on the input parameters); and third, updating on a regular basis the cost of capital to be used within the ratings based system. Portfolio dependency is required to make the cost of capital dependent on the composition of the portfolio and to capture the changing nature of the portfolio. This can be illustrated by the following two examples. First, consider two banks, bank M and N with 1 bi and 10 mi USD of Brazilian bonds respectively in their portfolios and assume they intend to add 100 mi USD of the same bonds to their portfolios. By making the cost of capital portfolio dependent one intends to better access the complex and intricate issues of concentration and diversification of the portfolios of each bank (see fig. 16 described in section 6) . Second, consider a bank that would have large positions on ABS's some five years ago. Assume the bank could roll the positions in time in a way to keep the whole composition of the portfolio constant. Financial innovation changed the nature of the market increasing the level of correlation on that asset class, the cost of capital of the portfolio would have increased (from 5 years to now).
Before entering on the scenario analysis, the first important step is to make a sensitivity analysis of the portfolio loss distribution with respect to each model parameter. The difficulty of the approach resides in determining the degree of changes that one needs to make in the input parameters: risk free interest rates, default probabilities / transition probabilities, correlation, recovery rates and spreads (with respect to risk free rates). For instance for the risk free interest rates one typically gives parallel shifts (from 50 to 100 bps 15 ) and changes the inclination of the curve (e.g. steepening of the curve of 25 bps). Spreads can be moved up and down by a factor of 10%. Changes in default probabilities or in the transition probabilities depends on the rating. The variations in correlations depend on the actual correlation stressed (e.g. equity or spread correlations). Observe that during the sensitivity analysis phase, one is not interested on the actual cause of the variations in the parameters. The variables are normally changed one at a time as if they would be independent of each other. The advantage of the approach is its simplicity in terms of data and implementation. A big disadvantage of the analysis is the fact that comovements between the variables are not captured. In reality the parameters change simultaneously potentialy causing higly non-linear effects in the economic capital measures.
Scenario-analysis are key to introducing the time-varying assumptions and to incorporate the forward-looking perspective in the decision making process. Two broad types of scenarioanalysis can be distinguished: historical scenario analysis or hypothetical scenario analysis. There are at least two advantages of the first type: First, data is more readily available. Second, historical scenario analysis immediately receives the required credibility as the scenario actually happened in the past. However, it also at least has two disadvantages: First, the credit portfolio might have been built to survive historically experienced shocks. Second, the scenarios do not take into account the economic realities and the development in the credit assets. For instance, standardised credit derivatives indices have been created in recent years and did not exist before 2002. Another example, is that during the credit crunch annedoctical evidence shows that market players have used the crossover index for hedging purposes independent of the nature of the portfolio. Hence, the existence of new instruments changes the dynamics of the market what may make a good deal of the historical scenarios irrelevant.
The hypothetical scenario analysis may (partly) resolve the disadvantages of the historical scenarios and offer the possibility to introduce the forward-looking perspective. The hypothetical scenarios should be based on a thorough analysis and understanding of the economic and financial environment, with forecast depending on the potential evolution of the environment and identification of how different risk factors could potentially play-out. The disadvantage of the approach is the difficulty in giving credibility to the scenarios. The more unique and important a scenario may be the harder it potentially is to make it convincing.
To capture a wide array of potential economic evolutions the framework could include three regimes: bullish, neutral and bearish 16 . For each regime different scenarios are regarded. For each scenario one has to determine how the scenario could affect the input parameters. The bullish scenarios represents expanding credit cycles typically involving tight spreads and consequent low defaults. Recent historically bullish scenarios are the internet bubble of the mid 90s, or the last 5 years in which credit spreads have become extremely tight. Examples of bearish scenarios could be: the savings and loan crisis (1980 and 1990), the Mexican peso crisis (1994), the Asian currency crisis (1997), the Russian crisis, the LTCM debacle (1998) and more recently the credit crisis.
The challenge then is to determine the impact of the different scenarios on the input parameters. A detailed study on this is out of the scope of this paper and we refer to the references that follow. The relationship between transition probabilities and the business cycle has been studied in Nickell et al. [NPV00] that found that transition probabilities change during periods of low, medium and high growth of GDP. A more recent reference is the study of Bangia et al. [BDS00] who proposed adapting the transition probability matrix for two regimes: expansion and contraction. The authors found that the ECAP should be around 30% higher during recession periods. The two studies assume constant recovery rates. We refer to Altman et al. [ABRS06] for a study showing the close link between recovery and default rates, and to Altman at al. [ARS01] for a first study showing how the 99% VaR varies if that relation is taken into account. More recently Chava et al. [CST06] and Bruche and Gonzalez-Aguado [BGA08] proposed models that combine default probability and recovery rates to model expected loss. Particularly Bruche and Gonzalez-Aguado found that the time variation of recovery rate distributions amplifies risk although the effect is much smaller than the impact of the time variation of default probabilities to the systematic risk. As we have described in section 3 and section 4 the default correlation is one of the hardest input variables to determine although it has a crucial impact on the determination of the ECAP. It is reported in Lucas [Luc95] , Bahar and Nagpal [BN01] and de Servigny and Renault [dSR02] that default correlations tend to increase over the time horizon (over a one year horizon the defaults would be rather firm specific, while over a three to five year horizon it may imply defaults could be caused by an industry wide crisis). In fig. 24 we show an extract of de Servigny and Renault in which we see the impact of the increase on correlation on the credit VaR at different quantiles when the economic cycle goes from growth to recession. Observe that at recession the correlation increases, and as such the VaR of a position at a certain quantile increases. Moreover, the higher the quantile the higher the impact of an increase in correlation. The implication of it is that if one entered on a position during an expansion and hedged that position, once evolving to and through a recession (as the VaR increases more with correlation), the hedges that had been calculated during the expansion will not be enough. So, changes in correlation from an expansion to a recession, makes that one will be insufficiently hedged when the economic cycle tightens.
The different steps to compute the ECAP of the credit portfolio are the following. For each scenario of each regime one generates the loss distribution and the derived ECAP figure (on both a portfolio and position level). As depicted in fig. 25 the scenarios will have been elaborated taking into account aggregated views on the credit assets of the portfolio (future defaults, spreads, recovery rates and correlations) and the economy (interest rates and correlations). With a weight attributed to each scenario we obtain an ECAP estimate for each regime. Similarly, each regime receives a weight and the total ECAP is given by the weighted average of each regime's ECAP. The probabilities (weights) associated to each regime and its scenarios are certainly subjective as each bank has its own assessment of the impact of economic on its portfolio. In order to cope with the inherent dynamic nature of the economic activity the framework has two ingredients. First, during the scenario analysis phase the input parameters have also been stressed to count for the impact of (structural) changes in the economy. Second, the entire analysis is to be updated on a regular basis (say quarterly or annually)
In practice the framework can be used to generate the capital costs for a rating based economic capital approach. The weights calculated by the system can be put on tables to be use for the determination of the risk weights of new positions that are included in the portfolio. The tables would have been generated for the different ratings, sectors and maturities. There are several advantages for this approach. First, the ECAP represent economic reality as seen by the bank. Second, it is portfolio dependent, potentially taking into account the issues of diversification and concentration. Third, the values are updated on a regular basis. Fourth, there is already a well understood framework for rating based systems inside of a financial institution and the only additionally huddle would be to feed the tables with numbers that updated on a regular basis.
In the next section we will integrate the approach here proposed in the context of active portfolio management.
The active and ECAP management
The second part of the framework consists of the active management of the credit risk exposures with the purpose to attain the predetermined strategic goals of the financial institution. Key to this active management is the integrated management team that is responsible for the short and mid-term activities and long term strategies of the institution. The central scenario analysis 17 provide a firm-wide view on the potential different economic evolutions/conditions on the short, mid and long-term. These views on the potential developments will be based on the insights from the trading teams, portfolio management teams and strategic management teams. The strategic management team will regularly monitor the feasibility of the predefined long-term goals and make occasional (opportunistic) adjustments to the firm's strategy. The first two teams have the responsibility for the active management, which implies the monitoring of the risk exposures and making the corrective actions to direct the firm to its strategic goals. Hence, the trading teams are responsible to take the (short-term) hedging positions. The portfolio management teams are, for instance, responsible for the securitization of the credit portfolios to off-load the concentrated exposures. Note, the important intersection between both activities. The securitization process is typically time consuming and may take several months until one year to be completed. During these months market conditions may considerably deteriorate, thereby, significantly decreasing the investors' interests in the securitization notes and exposing the firm to potential concentrated risk exposures and losses. It is the function of the short-term active management (as described in section 7) to take positions in liquid credit derivatives indices (via the trading desks) to hedge against the adverse market movements.
Underlying this management framework is a basic feedback loop that constantly checks the short and mid-term business evolutions with the strategic objectives and, subsequently, makes the required (short or mid-term) adjustments. For this, a set-up could be taken that, for instance, gives a green, yellow or red light that signals the strong achievement (green light) or deviation (red light) of the short and mid-term activity from their optimal business or portfolio composition (required to achieve the strategic goals). If an activity receives a yellow and red light, then action has to be taken (which could be predefined) to steer the business back to the long-term strategic goals. This system would thus generate early warning signals that should detect difficulties ahead and prevent business deteriorations or thus significant losses materialising. Observe that a dashboard containing a summary of the results on the total ECAP and its subdivisions along business lines, important asset classes or sectors, or even individual positions should be generated for monitoring purposes (maybe on a weekly basis). Fig.27 provides a stylized overview of the framework.
There are several advantages behind the approach and systems here proposed. First, we keep the simplicity of the rating based framework while adapting it on a regular basis, taking into account the fact that the capital consumption is portfolio dependent. Second, the framework implies the creation of management teams within the financial institution that analyze the potential risks affecting the institution. The existence of a framework based on stress tests and scenario analysis will considerably increase the level market and economic awareness throughout the financial institutions. Third, issues such as financial innovation have a higher chance to be detected and captured earlier. Fourth, it puts economic capital at the center of the decision making process, potentially implying a more efficient organization. Fifth, the entire framework implies the creation of a credit ALM desk for hedging purposes. This implies the use of credit derivatives indices for hedging and for fair valuing the credit portfolio
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been many folds.
First, given the strong growth of the securitization activity and being at the heart of the credit crisis, we point at the importance of the (loan) securitization business for the efficient use of capital.
Second, we explained that key elements for the further development of the securitization activity are appropriate liquid standardized credit derivative indices that provide the information on the particular asset classes for the price discovery. For the standardized corporate credit indices, their liquidity and transparency made them ideal instruments for the trading and hedging of corporate bond portfolios. Though, we noted that even for these indices and the trading and hedging techniques based on them, there are still some open issues such as the methods for correlation mapping. This liquidity and transparency, is not present for the ABS asset class. As an example we discussed the CDO's of (subprime) MBS's for which currently the ABX.HE index and the TABX.HE exist. We pinpointed that currently, there is not only absence of a standardized market model to price ABX.HE tranches, but additionally, the relevant data on the underlying collateral may be lacking or is difficult to obtain. For instance, quotes on CDS of ABS's (the collateral of the ABX) are hardly available and the prepayment assumptions of the underlying collateral are unclear. Given the importance of the mortgage securitization market, transparency on the mortgage related indices is crucial.
Third, we discussed the change in risk characteristics of the financial institutions' credit portfolio, due to the shedding of credit risk via securitization and the subsequent securitization investments. To manage the risks properly a more sophisticated risk approach is necessary than the current generally employed static rating based approach. In this paper we propose the main concepts for a dynamic credit ECAP framework.
The proposal involves the creation of a firm-wide integrated credit management framework that has a main objective to optimize the use of the credit economic capital of the firm. The framework is dynamic in that it is based on two main aspects: portfolio dependency and time-varying assumptions. Stress testing and scenario analysis, and a feedback loop are crucial elements to introduce this time-varying aspect. The framework has different substructures that depend on the time horizons of the credit management activities. What we called in here, the Credit ALM, is responsible for the short-term credit management (let say three months). It hedges via standardized credit indices potential concentrated credit exposures, thereby thus preserving the mark to market of the credit portfolio from significant losses. The credit portfolio management searches for an optimization of the credit point, by deciding on the credit securitization and investment activity. The long term management (say, 5 years) determines and monitors the achievement of the strategic goals of the group.
Further studies of the authors show in more detail the actual modeling and structuring of the dynamic ECAP framework.
A The Default Process
In this section we describe the two widely used techniques among practitioners for modeling credit events (both for downgrades and default) and two important concepts, nl the copula function and factor analysis, that are key concepts underlying both methodologies. The first methodology is known as firm / asset value, latent variable or structural model and is based in the original work of Merton [Mer74] for option pricing. There are several good references available and among them we refer to Bluhm et al. [CBC03] and the Servigny and Renault [dSR04] for more details. The second methodology is known as the reduced form model and is based on the original work of Duffie and Singleton [DS99] . The reduced form models are more recent and mathematically more complex.
A.1 Asset Value and Reduced Form Models
The basic idea behind the model is to link the level of asset return of a company to the ability (or disability) of a company to generate enough cash to honor its debt (or default). Under the Merton approach the credit condition of a company (for any given horizon) depends on the asset value of the firm. The model is illustrated in fig.28 and as we can see if a company's asset value falls below a certain threshold (the book value (BV) of the firm) it is said to be in default. The probability of default is determined from the distance between the asset value and the default barrier (the book value) of the company.
Though, a first difficulty of the model is that the asset value of a company is not a market observable variable. A second complication is that book value is not readily available. To solve the first difficulty a common market practice is to assume that the equity return of a company is a good proxy for its asset return process. This assumption has two advantages. The first is that asset returns are log normal and, hence, one can rely on the option model of Black and Scholes to calculate the probability of default (PD). The second advantage is the huge amount of equity return data available when compared with the scarce default data.
The asset value model is largely used by market practitioners to model credit portfolios loss distributions as it is a central piece in most commercial risk systems (e.g. MKMV (from Moody's KMV) and CreditMetrics (from RiskMetrics)). We elaborate on these risk systems in section 3. Additionally, it is an integrand part of the rating agency tools for the rating of structured finance deals (see e.g. Fitch [KG04] , Moody's [YFO04] and S&P [KG03] ). This will be discussed in more detail in section 4.
The Merton model is also used to calculate probabilities of default for the evaluation of Credit Default Swap (CDS) prices. The calibration process, however, is harder than for the reduced form models. We refer to Longstaff and Schawartz [LS95] , Hull and White [HW95] and Schonbucher [Sch96] for more details. Underlying the reduced form approach is the assumption that the firm's default time is inaccessible. Therefore, it defines default as the time that a certain variable switches from the non default into the default state, whereby, the process is driven by a latent variable. The variable serves as an indicator of the default event and is commonly modeled using a Cox process (we refer to Schonbucher [Sch03] for more details). It is standard market practice to consider that the default intensity varies deterministically in time (called the inhomogeneous Poisson process (IPP)). An illustration is given in fig. 29 . In the credit derivatives markets the IPP process has been the market standard to price credit default swaps (CDS's).
A.2 The Copula Function
Central for the assessment of credit risk or the pricing of credit securitization products is the generation of the joint loss distribution. The challenge is to derive the joint loss distribution, which is coherent with the marginal (observed) default probability distribution of the underlying portfolio or collateral and obeys the dependencies among the assets.
More formally, the mathematic issue consists of the determination of a joint probability distribution given its marginals and their interdependencies. This issue has first been treated by Sklar [Skl73] who proved that under some standard technical conditions (e.g. continuity of the marginals) any such a multivariate distribution can be written in the form of a copula function and that the copula is not unique. The common market adopted practice is to use the multi normal gaussian copula that is defined as:
where Σ is the correlation function, N m is the multi normal m dimensional distribution function, and N −1 is the inverse of the univariate normal distribution function. The gaussian copula is, among other reasons, chosen for its appropriateness with the Merton model, as under the gaussian copula the assumption holds that the equity return correlations can be used for the asset correlations. Additionally, it is chosen for its modeling and calibrating convenience.
A.3 Factor Analysis
For the management of the typical credit portfolios of banks dimensionality reduction techniques are employed for several reasons. A first reason, among others, is that the size of the portfolio may have hundreds of thousand of obligors. Second, are the simplifying assumptions that permit to map the different obligors in certain homogeneous buckets. A third reason is related to the performance of the algorithm underlying the risk model that should be fast enough, for instance, to permit stress testing studies of the credit portfolio.
The main objective of using factor analysis for modeling the default process of a portfolio is to make the dependencies of the portfolio's underlying names dependent on a limited set of common factors. For credit risk modeling it became standard market practice to make the retuns of a company conditional upon systematic and idiosyncratic factors. The systematic factors affect the obligors in general and represent risks that cannot be diversified away. The idiosyncratic factor represents particularities of the observed company, which in a portfolio can be diversified away, and which are assumed to be independent of the other risk factors. In a formula this gives:
where X M represents the systematic factors (the market) and ξ the idiosyncratic factors. The Regulatory Capital (RC) formulas of Basel II, the credit VaR measures and Economic Capital (ECAP) models, and the models for rating structured deals of rating agencies, or for securitization and pricing standardized credit derivatives are based on eq. 9. In the next sections we will describe how the model is adapted for these different banking activities.
B The Recursive Approach and the Gaussian Copula
For pricing purposes one needs to generate the loss distribution and as mentioned in the text the return is given using the one factor Basel assumption (see eq.2). We follow the standard market algorithm the so called recursive approach by Andersen et al [ASB03] and compute by means of a simple recursion formula a discretised version of the conditional loss distribution. A loss unit u is chosen so that within a certain tolerance, losses can be represented by integers. For the iTraxx Europe Main portfolio with an assumed uniform recovery rate of 40%, the loss unit is 0.48%. We denote by P (i) (l, t|X) the probability of l losses (in terms of the loss unit u) at time t with i names conditional on the market factor X. Recalling that conditional on X all the default probabilities are independent, we can write that P (i) (l, t|X) is the sum of two terms: P (i) (l, t|X) = P (i−1) (l, t|X)P(τ i > t|X) + P (i−1) (l − ω (i) , t|X)(1 − P(τ i > t|X)),
where ω (i) is the loss in terms of the loss unit u incurred by a default of the ith name. The unconditional loss distribution is found by integrating over the market factor
where f (X) is the density of the probability distribution of the market factor X. The fair spread of a CDO tranche balances the present value of the fee F leg, given by:
and the present value of the contingent leg C, given by
In these equations the summations run over the payment dates, S is the spread premium on a yearly basis, d(t) is the risk-free discount factor, ∆t i = t i − t i−1 is the year fraction, E[L (Tr) i ] is the expected loss on the tranche at time t i and N (Tr) is the tranche size. For the [0-3%] equity tranche the spread is fixed at 500 basis points 18 and the upfront value is quoted. Observe that for the cases of iTraxx / CDX corporate indexes the notional N (T r) does not change in time.
C Prepayment and ABX.HE/TABX.HE
In the pricing algorithm for TABX.HE one needs to take into account the fact that the MBS collateral amortizes. The amortization comes from two sources: scheduled capital amortization and the (non-scheduled) prepaymenet of the whole mortgage. Assume the amortized bond B AM is a floater paying a copupon C. The value of B is given by:
In these equations the summations run over the payment dates t i . We denote by L i , N i , P S (t i ) and d(t i ) as the Libor rate, the notional, the survival probability and the discount factor respectively at time t i . The year fraction is represented by ∆t i = t i − t i−1 . Analogously for the value of an amortized CDS paying a spread S on notionals N i we have:
In our formulas above N i includes normal capital amortization and the prepayments.
D On Correlation Mapping
One such a typical approach for example called moneyness matching assumes that the ratio between attachment point and portfolio expected loss is invariant between the two portfolios. That is, for a certain attachment point X be we have:
where E[L be ] and E[L index ] are the expected losses of the bespoke and the index portfolios respectivelly, and the base correlation for X be is taken from the index base correlation at X index calculated in eq.16 above. Assuming the average spread to be proportional to expected loss the approach means that the (unknown) correlation curve for the bespoke portfolio is such that:
The approach mentioned may be quite dependent on the interpolation methodologies used for the base correlation and moreover one may need to extrapolate the base correlation. A more serious drawback is that the methodology does not take into account the (spread) dispersions in the portfolios. Although the technique might not be locally sound, that is, the loss distribution of the bespoke tranche might not match the loss distribution of the tranche in the index, it might be more appropriate if one is managing a portfolio of bespokes on the index. In order to see it just consider that a diversified portfolio of bespoke deals of corporate European credits has a good deal of chances to be very much correlated with the main index (iTraxx). Intuitively then although on a deal by deal basis one might be more exposed to idiosyncratic risk, this risk reduces on a portofolio basis. Alternative methodologies that addresses the issues above may search for the points that match default probabilities:
or that matches the (base) expected loss ratios of the tranches directly:
One should be aware that there are several issues when interpolating the base correlation curve. The main problem is that correlation is a non-intuitive concept. 
